I am Assistant Professor of Finance at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management.

​Since 2022, I am a member of the Finance Theory Group.

 I obtained my PhD in Economics at the LSE.

​Here you can find my CV.


The Equilibrium Size and Value Added of Venture Capital (ssrn)

Journal of Finance, 79 (2), 2024

Click for an Abstract

I model positive sorting of entrepreneurs across the high and low value-added segments of the venture capital market. Aiming to attract high-quality entrepreneurs, inefficiently many venture capitalists (VCs) commit to provide high value-added by forming small portfolios. This draws the marginal entrepreneur away from the low value-added segment, reducing match quality in the high value-added segment too. There is underinvestment. Multiple equilibria may emerge, and they differ in aggregate investment. The model rationalizes evidence on VC returns and value-added along fundraising “waves” and when the cost of entrepreneurship falls, and generates untested predictions on the size and value-added of venture capital. 


Committing to Trade: A Theory of Intermediation

R&R at the Journal of Financial Economics

Selected presentations: FTG Members Meeting Fall 2023, EARIE 2023, FIRS 2024 (Berlin), Barcelona School of Economics Summer Forum 2024

Click for an Abstract

In a “lemons” market, a shock moving the gains from trade is publicly observed before buyers make their offer. When gains from trade are lower, prices contain a larger adverse selection discount. By trading via intermediaries, sellers commit to sell high-quality assets in such states, which may improve surplus, despite impeding efficient use of available information. The distribution of agents' valuations and the level of uncertainty in gains from trade affect intermediaries' markups, traded assets' quality and volumes. In the optimal contract, intermediaries (inefficiently) ration buyers when gains from trade are lowest, consistently with what happens in the leveraged loans market. 

Margining and Systemic Risk (with Jing Zeng)

draft coming soon

Click for an Abstract

We model financial institutions (FIs) who hedge their portfolio risks using over-the-counter contracts and thus become connected. Due to a network externality, the privately optimal contract makes FIs inefficiently exposed to counterparty risk, resulting in excessive contagion, hence defaults. We show that injecting liquidity into FIs' balance sheet is least effective at reducing systemic risk, ironically, when FIs are most tightly connected, due to their private response to the policy. Moreover, when the value of the assets used to meet margin calls is volatile, the privately optimal margin can be inefficiently high, and minimum margin requirements can aggravate systemic risk.

Persuading Experts in OTC Markets 

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In OTC markets, privately informed asset owners face investors who differ in expertise: the ability to evaluate assets. Investors incentive to use expertise is motivated by rent-seeking, and depends on their beliefs about average assets quality—the state of the economy. I characterize the optimal policy to disclose the state of the economy. The policy always improves over, and can generate large gains against, the fully observable state benchmark. It affects equilibrium expertise, which is inefficient due to the cream-skimming externality and non-internalized effects on assets origination incentives. The policy does not necessarily aim at minimizing the probability of a market dry-up. 

A Model of Risk Taking With Experimentation and Career Concerns (with Gianpaolo Caramellino) 

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We model an economy where managers create value through their ability to learn at an intermediate stage about the intrinsic profitability of a risky investment. Managers are heterogeneous in their ability to extract information from experiments, and care about their reputation. Their incentive to take on risk is distorted by career concerns, and can result in under or over risk-taking. This is determined by whether discarding a risky project following the experiment is more typical of better managers. We also show that, in an effort to appear informed, managers at the same time reduce risk-taking when investments are only marginally positive NPV, and engage in excessive costly experimentation when investments are more profitable. 


"Sustainable Organizations", Geelen, T., Hajda, J. and J. Starmans, (slides)
IWH-FIN-FIRE Workshop at Halle (2023)

"Biased Wisdom From the Crowd", Zhao, D. and Z. Zhou, (slides)
Aarhus Workshop on Strategic Interaction in Corporate Finance (2023)

"Do SDIs Undermine Upstream Lending", Anjos, F., Demirci, I. and M. Oliveira, (slides)
Vienna Festival of Finance Theory (2023)

"Currency Competition with Firms", Guennewig, M., (slides)
8th Emerging Scholars in Banking and Finance (2022)

"The More Illiquid, The More Expensive", Choi, J., Han, J., Jin, S. S. and J. H. Yoon (slides)
Junior European Finance Seminar (2021)